不对称信息下餐饮企业绿色供应链管理实践多案例研究

本文通过多案例研究方法研究了餐饮企业在不对称信息下实施绿色供应链管理的实践以及信任关系协调,即企业如何在供应链中有效地传递环境绩效信息,协调机会主义行为与信任合作之间的关系。研究表明：企业通过第三方独立认证,可以构建绿色品牌声誉,从而向利益相关者传递环境绩效信息;通过契约合同及纵向一体化可以实现绿色采购;不对称信息下,企业面临平衡信任合作与机会主义行为之间的矛盾问题,需要通过提高信任程度来实现绿色供应链管理的持续改进。     

基于博弈理论的设计施工联合体行为分析 *

运用博弈理论及信息经济学,分析了设计施工联合体各主体间的行为动机及相互间影响,结合广州新光快速路工程实践总结了设计施工联合体所取得的经验和启示,为完善设计施工联合体总承包模式提供依据和参考。     

Price Cycles and Asymmetric Price Transmission in the U.S. Pork Market

Economists have proposed several plausible explanations for observed price transmission asymmetries in commodity markets. Unfortunately, the econometric methods commonly used in such studies cannot empirically distinguish pricing behavior under the competing theories. We argue that the theories may be classified by firm responses to high- and low-frequency price cycles and use Engle's band spectrum regression to test the symmetry of high- and low-frequency cycles in weekly pork prices. The findings indicate that changes in wholesale prices are asymmetrically transmitted to retail prices in relatively low-frequency cycles, which does not support search costs and other high-frequency explanations. Conversely, wholesale pork prices asymmetrically adjust to changes in farm prices at all frequencies.     

Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

A simple principal-agent model with bilateral asymmetric information and common values is developed. The agent(s) has private information about his characteristics but does not knowhow these affect outcomes. The principal knows how the characteristics translate into outcomes, but does not observe the characteristics. It is shown that equilibrium contracts aresimple in being designednot to reveal the agent's characteristics. When the agent knows howsome of his characteristics affect the outcome, contracts will be differentiated with respect to precisely those characteristics. An application to the use of genetic information is considered.     

Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

Summary. In this paper we introduce a new model of ex ante contracting for economies with asymmetric information to examine endogenously determined communication plans for information sharing in the interim stage. In contrast to the models used in previous research, in the present model agents negotiate not only on a contract of state contingent allocations but also on a communication plan, a set of rules describing how agents will reveal part of their private information at the interim stage to execute the trade contracts. We prove a result about the nested structure of the set of allocations implementable by various communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions. Received: 4 March 1998; revised version: 17 September 1999     

Signaling,Financial Slack and Corporate Acquisitions

This paper shows that under certain conditions a firm's decision concerning the optimal medium of exchange to use in acquiring another firm is related to the decision of which source of capital should be used to finance long-term projects. An example of this type of interaction occurs when the firm's only source of financing a positive net present value project is an equity issue. In a Myers and Majluf (1984) world of asymmetric information the value maximizing strategy for the firm is to forego the public equity offering and instead use a stock offer to acquire a firm possessing financial slack. The process is modeled using an extension of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model and demonstrates how the acquisition alternative allows managers to separate the signals regarding the investment and financing decisions. Including net pension assets into our measure of financial slack, we provide empirical supports for the ability of the extended model to explain observed merger activity.     

Green Business and Blue Angels

This paper presents a model of a monopolist'svoluntary overcompliance with legal environmentalstandards under asymmetric information about thefirm's environmental impacts. The key assumptions are:the existence of quality premia for environmentalsoundness, a positive but imperfect degree ofmonitoring, and adaptive consumer expectations.Conditions necessary for overcompliance to arise in aprofit-maximizing equilibrium are derived. The effectsof a third-party eco-labeling system are analyzed. Itis shown that the existence of an independent labelingauthority increases the likelihood of overcomplianceto be profit-maximizing. Moreover, firms might have anincentive to lobby for the introduction of such asystem. The effect of consumers' risk preferences andan instrument for preventing ``Greenwash' (companieslying about their environmental performance) is alsodiscussed.     

Anonymity,Stealth Trading,and the Information Content of Broker Identity

This paper examines whether the identity of a broker involved in transactions contains information. Using a sample of transactions from the Australian Stock Exchange—where broker identity is transparent—we provide evidence that consecutive buyer‐/seller‐initiated transactions by the same broker have a relatively high permanent price impact. This implies that broker identity conveys information to market participants, and that markets in which broker identity is disclosed are likely to be more efficient. We also find that medium‐sized trades by the same broker convey greater information than large and small trades, which is consistent with stealth trading by informed investors.     

A High‐Frequency Investigation of the Interaction between Volatility and DAX Returns

One of the most noticeable stylised facts in finance is that stock index returns are negatively correlated with changes in volatility. The economic rationale for the effect is still controversial. The competing explanations have different implications for the origin of the relationship: Are volatility changes induced by index movements, or inversely, does volatility drive index returns? To differentiate between the alternative hypotheses, we analyse the lead‐lag relationship of option implied volatility and index return in Germany based on Granger causality tests and impulse‐response functions. Our dataset consists of all transactions in DAX options and futures over the time period from 1995 to 2005. Analyzing returns over 5‐minute intervals, we find that the relationship is return‐driven in the sense that index returns Granger cause volatility changes. This causal relationship is statistically and economically significant and can be clearly separated from the contemporaneous correlation. The largest part of the implied volatility response occurs immediately, but we also observe a smaller retarded reaction for up to one hour. A volatility feedback effect is not discernible. If it exists, the stock market appears to correctly anticipate its importance for index returns.     

非对称网络权力与产业网络的空间组织——以我国台湾地区流行音乐产业网络为例

本文探讨了产业网络中非对称网络权力的形成机理,构建了非对称网络权力与产业网络空间组织间相互关系的理论分析框架,并从我国台湾地区流行音乐产业网络案例的分析获得实践支撑。结论表明:在产业网络中企业因要素占有或支配能力差异,形成由技术权力区、渠道权力区和权力塌陷区构成的非对称网络权力,产业网络的组织层级与空间层级间呈现相互对应的海默关系,而企业空间组织行为的区位锚定效应进一步强化网络权力的非对称结构。